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DUELING OVER THE DUAL PRACTICE
By HENRY G. BURKE*
The dual practice of law and accountancy has developed an impos-
ing body of comment. Each writer has tried to state the problem in
simple terms, yet there seems to be a tendency for the issues to get
out of hand and for every manifestation and facet to acquire a com-
plexity of its own. Those who have taken the position that the dual
practice is valid and viable proceed on the assumption that no in-
superable ethical conflicts need confront the dual practitioner and that
his practice serves a public need. Those who condemn the practice
assume that, as soon as the lawyer has obtained the CPA certificate
or the CPA has been admitted to the Bar, he must suppress the publi-
cation of one or the other of his dual qualifications in order to avoid
conflict with the canons of ethics of the American, state and local Bar
Associations. If the latter position were "a truth universally acknowl-
edged,"' the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and
all state and local bar associations would have endorsed this conclusion.
Instead, we find that most state and local bar associations have re-
mained silent and, consequently, neutral.2
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 1946
refused to condemn the dual practice and has not changed its opinion
since.' The dominant document, on the other side, is Opinion 297 of the
American Bar Association Ethics Committee." The most significant part
of Opinion 297 answers the question: "Under what circumstances, if
any, is it ethical for a lawyer who is also a public accountant to render
both legal and accounting services?" 5 The Committee on Professional
Ethics answered:
The person who is qualified as both a lawyer and an account-
ant must choose between holding himself out as a lawyer and hold-
ing himself out as an accountant. As stated in the answer to Ques-
tion 3, dual holding out is self-touting and a violation of Canon 27.
If he elects to hold himself out as an accountant, he must not
practice law or he will violate Canon 27 in that he will be using
his activity as an accountant to feed his law practice. In determin-
ing whether he is practicing law when he holds himself out only
as an accountant, the controlling factor is whether the activity
in question is one which would constitute the practice of law when
engaged in by one holding himself out as a lawyer.
* LL.B., 1927, University of Maryland; Ph.D., 1933, Johns Hopkins University;
President, Maryland Association of Certified Public Accountants, 1932-33.
1. AuSTEN, PRIDE AND PREjUDICE 1 (1813).
2. See Goldberg, Dual Practice of Law and Accountancy: A Lawyer's Paradox,
1966 DUKZ L.J. 117, 136 n.87.
3. See 83 J. ACCOUNTANCY 172 (1947).
4. ABA COMMITTZ ON PROIESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS Ort TH COMMITTZZ
ON PROVESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 8 (1963-1964 Supp.).
5. Id. at 9.
DUELING OVER THE DUAL PRACTICE
If he elects to hold himself out as a lawyer, he will not
violate any Canon of Ethics merely because in rendition of legal
services he utilizes and applies accounting principles. It is not, of
course, within the jurisdiction of this Committee to determine
whether in any instance he is acting contrary to the governing
restraints applicable to him as an accountant. 6
This Opinion has been fons et 'origo of most pronouncements
condemning the dual practice. The joint report of the committees on
Professional Ethics of the Maryland State Bar Association and the
Bar Association of Baltimore City finds most of its inspiration and
authority in Opinion 297. 7 The clearest bar association statements
which do not follow Opinion 297 are those of the Idaho and Ohio
State Bars.' Although Opinion 297, as well as the Opinion of the
Maryland and Baltimore Bar Association Ethics Committees, deals
with many related questions, which are also covered fully or in part
by the Opinions of other bar associations on both sides of the issue,
the fundamental question is whether an attorney, who is also qualified
as a certified public accountant, may ethically publicize his qualification
as a lawyer and accountant. If a conclusive "yes" or "no" were accepted
to this question, most other issues would probably solve themselves.
The situation of the lawyer employed as a "house attorney" by an ac-
counting firm or the CPA employed as a "house accountant" by a firm
of lawyers presents no real difficulty. Although much has been written
on this subject, there is little real difference of opinion. Likewise, there
is no real disagreement as to the formation of proper partnerships in
firms holding themselves out as lawyers or CPA's.
The proponents of both positions with regard to the dual practice
have subsumed their arguments under the same headings. The favorite
topics have centered around the public interest, the dual holding out
which encompasses the announcement of a specialty in two professions,
both of which are unprepared to permit the promulgation of specialities,
the treatment of the dual practice as ipso facto advertising, the use of 'the
two professions as a feeder for each other, the irreconcilability of the
lawyer as advocate with the accountant as independent attestor or
appraiser, and the impossibility of acquiring a 'high degree of proficiency
in two professions. Of less significance, ,but, nevertheless, fully developed
in the literature, are such questions as the economic advantages 'to the
6. Id. at 11.
7. See The Daily Record (Baltimore), April 11, 1966, p. 3.
8. Opinion No. 10 issued by the Committee on Professional Ethics of the
Idaho State Bar; Opinion No. 22 issued by the Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct
Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association (May 31, 1966).
The Idaho position is briefly summarized in the following statement: "An attorney
who is also qualified as a certified public accountant may carry the designation
'Certified Public Accountant' on his office door, his professional card, and on his
letterhead, and may practice both professions from the same office, providing that he
adheres to the professional standards applicable to attorneys at law with respect to
advertising and solicitation." The Advocate (Idaho State Bar Foundation), April,
1959, p. 4. The Ohio position is less forthright. It recognizes that the lawyer may
properly engage in other activity, such as accounting, but warns that the dual practice
may lead to conflicts or create an equivocal position which the practitioner must
seek to avoid.
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client in being able to consult a single practitioner rather than two and
the implied claim of outstanding proficiency in the field of taxation. 9
PUBLIC INTEREST
When considering the public interest there is a danger that one
may make a psychological transfer and merge the interests of an indi-
vidual or organization with the interest of the general public. One may
easily slip into the fallacy of believing that what is good for the Ameri-
can Bar Association or what is good for the American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants is good for the public. There are areas, how-
ever, in which the interest of the professional association and the inter-
est of its members may run contrary to the interest of the public.
As an example of an association placing its interests above that of
the public, perhaps no better illustration may be offered than the battle
of the American Medical Association against a national health insur-
ance program. For over fifty years, with an expenditure well in excess
of fifty million dollars, the American Medical Association, through its
lobbyists and 'by the use of every other means at its disposal, was able
to block the enactment of a national health insurance program.'" It
may be unfair to invoke ethical and moral concepts in the case of busi-
ness associations, such as the National Association of Manufacturers,
but one has a right to expect professional organizations to exercise
ethical and moral restraint.
Frequently, the arguments concerning public interest represent
a mixture of fact and law which require careful sorting before they may
be reasonably judged." The admission of the legal right of the indi-
vidual to hold himself out as a member of both professions should dis-
pose of the question, but Opinion 297 and the reports of various state
bar associations condemning the dual practice give the impression that
it is illegal and must be suppressed. These opinions endeavor -to throw
the prestige of the organization behind a principle which, at this mo-
ment, has no legal authority.
In order not to be diverted by the side issues which are inter-
woven in discussing the public interest, a concise statement by those
favoring the dual practice and those opposing it will define the two
9. How heated the discussion of the dual practitioner problem has become is
illustrated by an article written by W. D. Sprague and A. J. Levy entitled Accounting
and Law: Is Dual Practice in the Public Interest?, J. ACCOUNT'ANCY 46 (December,
1966) and 52 A.B.A.J. 1110 (1966). This article was followed in the February, 1967,
issue of the ABAJ by nine letters denouncing it under the scare headline "Messrs.
Levy and Sprague are drawn and quartered," and by further denunciation which
appeared in the March issue. 53 A.B.A.J. 100, 106, 108, 110-11, 116, 119, 210, 215-17
(1967).
10. HARRIs, A SACRED TRUST (1966).
11. In the "Sprague-Levy" article, the authors admit the legal right of the dual
practitioner to practice either or both professions and then noticeably pass on to
discussing the dilution of his experience because of diversification in two fields. "Ad-
mittedly he is permitted by law or regulation to practice either or both professions.
His experience in each profession necessarily will be diluted to some extent because
of the diversification into two fields instead of one. On the other hand, at some point
in his career, his years of experience in each field may possibly exceed that of a
relatively new practitioner in either field." J. AccouNTANcy 46 (December, 1966).
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approaches to the problem. The favorable view is that taken by the
accountants in the statement published in 1947 that "the compelling
consideration, in our opinion, is the desirability of allowing the public
complete freedom in the selection of lawyers or certified public ac-
countants, who the public 'believes can render most effectively the
professional services it desires."12 The opposing view may be found
in the joint report of the Professional Ethics Committees of the Mary-
land and Baltimore Bar Associations: "The lawyer should not be al-
lowed to equip ,himself with two cloaks, each lined with different
allegiances, restraints and 'responsibilities and possible penalties, es-
pecially if he is permitted to change 'his cloak as the occasion may re-
quire, to the confusion of the court, the client and the public.' 3 The
picturesque language of the joint report leaves this author a little
breathless. It might at least 'be admitted that when the joint practitioner
appears before the court as a lawyer, it is hardly likely that the court
will be confused or find it necessary to enter into a minute examination
of the mantle 'he is wearing to determine what qualities and qualifica-
tions he may have other than that of being a lawyer.
With respect to the client and public, it is also presumptuous for
the bar associations to assume that the dual practice must necessarily
lead to confusion on the part of client and 'public and, consequently,
should be proscribed. It is this sort of paternalistic arrogance which
makes it difficult to reduce a relatively simple problem to its basic
terms. Opinion 297 attempts to create the impression 'that, even 'in his
most menial activities, the lawyer never discards the mantle of 'his
profession; 'the intended effect has no basis in reality.
The second part of the public interest issue usually turns on the
inability of the dual practitioner to acquire the sort of competence that
the public has a right to expect. The question of proficiency or compe-
tence is discussed more fully below, but the manner in which it is intro-
duced into the consideration of the public interest issue is really self-
defeating. If the objection to the dual practice is that it is impossible
to acquire proficiency in two professions and, 'therefore, the public
is being deliberately deceived by a dual holding out, then this short-
coming would have become apparent long ago, and the 'individual prac-
titioner, in self-defense, would have retired to a single field. On the
other hand, the growth of the dual practice is, in itself, proof that a
market demand is being met and that the individual with the dual
qualifications is ready to stand on 'his ability to perform such tasks
as he may conscientiously undertake. If the task he assumes lies beyond
his competence, his position is no different from that of the single
practitioner.
DUAL HOLDING OUT
When we move -to the dual holding out argument and to the argu-
ments which are usually described as ethical, we find that under the
captions of self-laudation, announcement of a specialty, and advertising,
12. 83 J. ACCOUNTANCY 171, 172-73 (1947).13. The Daily Record, supra note 7.
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the issues are so closely knitted that the discussion of one necessarily
involves the discussion of the others.'4
Referring to dual holding out as "self-touting and self-laudation,"
the Ethics Committees of the Maryland and Baltimore Bar Associations
stated -that:
There can be no other true reason for or result but that one
holding out would enhance, complement and be a feeder of employ-
ment for the other, and in effect be a direct or indirect solicitation
one for -the other. This is particularly apparent when one acknowl-
edges that the skills of one or the other can be just as effectively
applied when the attorney or the accountant elects to proclaim him-
self in a single capacity. 15
The difficulty with the committee report is that again the factors
have been so jumbled that the net result is self-contradiction. The
only sin that the committee is fighting appears to 'be holding out. No
objection is raised to the use of the skills of one profession by a prac-
titioner in the other. It might be pointed out that this approach hardly
establishes a very 'high moral standard for professional conduct. The
practitioner is being told that he may utilize everything that his training
or experience has provided but should refrain from 'holding himself out
as a member of a profession to which he has been legally admitted.
The other objection to the solution contained in the joint report is
that, by implication, oral self-touting or self-laudation is considered
unobjectionable, whereas a simple or honest statement on the door of
one's office would constitute a serious grievance. Thus, there is the
further implication in the position taken by the Professional Ethics
Committees that devious or subtle self-laudation falls within the per-
mitted rules. Those who 'believe that the joint practice should be per-
mitted see no violation of existing ethical canons in the dual holding
out. With regard to advertising and self-laudation, the answer is that
the practitioner is merely identifying himself and claiming no su-
periority in comparison with other practitioners."
If the contention is made that the difference between identification
and the announcement of a specialty is merely juggling words, the pro-
ponents of the dual practice are also prepared with a full and complete
answer. They reply that both the legal profession and the accounting
profession have set up inviolable rules with regard to self-laudation,
advertising, and the announcement of the specialty, which would prevent
the practitioner in either field from engaging unpunished in such an
unethical practice. The dual practitioner is subject to regulations 'by
the published ethics of both professions which, therefore, should act
as a double check on improper conduct.
14. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 2, at 124-25, 128; Brent, Accounting and Law:Concurrent Practice Is in the Public Interest, J. ACCOUNTANCY 38, 44 (March, 1967) ;Hughes, Outlook for the Lawyer-CPA, 39 TxXAs L. REv. 59, 71 (1960) ; Comment,
3 U.C.L.A.L. Riv. 360-362 (1956).
15. The Daily Record, supra note 7, at col. 4-5.
16. Brent, supra note 14, at 44. See Canon 27.
[VOL. XXVII
DUELING OVER THE DUAL PRACTICE
The attempt to attack the dual practice on the ground that dual
holding out is the announcement of a specialty 7 seems to hark back to
the time when accounting may have been regarded as "a handmaiden
to the legal profession."' 8 It is possible that both the accounting pro-
fession and legal profession are late in recognizing the growth of spe-
cialization.'" Perhaps, in the fields of corporation law, probate law,
domestic relations, real estate law, labor law, and tax law, both the
public and the profession would gain by the recognition of specialties.
At present, however, little light is -thrown on the controversy with
regard to the dual issue, as neither profession is ready to recognize
specialties in the manner permitted in the medical profession. In part,
this failure is due to the absence of any existing machinery for qualify-
ing those who are known as specialists and, in part, it is due to the
difficulty presented by the large firms in both professions where the
announcement of the specialty might create serious problems in existing
partnerships.
The argument with regard to self-laudation starts out with the
assumption that, by the dual holding out, the dual practitioner is
claiming a superiority in an unethical manner. It is unreasonable to
attribute a claim of superiority where no such claim is made and then
proceed with the condemnation of the practice because the claim has
been made. Some of this confusion arises from the failure to recognize
realistically that members of both professions acquire reputations as
experts, which may not, ,however, be reduced to formal announcement.
In this situation, we face another instance of practice running ahead
of rules. It is not within the scope of the present discussion to deal with
the question of 'how this gap may be closed.
THE FEEDER ARGUMENT
The feeder argument leaps out of Opinion 297 in the assertion
that Canon 27 of the professional ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion is being violated "because the lawyer-accountant firm would almost
inevitably serve as a feeder to the legal firm."20 In direct response to this
assertion "the honest practitioner, I am sure, will after a moment's
reflection on his own career, agree that every activity he engages
in in his daily life, in effect, feeds his practice. It is his associa-
tions and the impressions he gives to the public that brings his clients
to his door."'
17. Canon 46 states:
A lawyer available to act as an associate of other lawyers in a particular
branch of the law or legal service, may send to local lawyers only and publish in
his local legal journal a brief and dignified announcement of his availability to
serve other lawyers in connection therewith. The announcement should be in a
form which does not constitute a statement or representation of special experience
or expertness.
18. See J. AccouNTANcy 64 (March, 1967).
19. See Resh and Habermann, A Practical Answer to Specialization, 6 Case &
Com. 35 (Nov.-Dec., 1966).
20. See note 4 supra.
21. Wilson, The Attorney-C.P.A. and the Dual Practice Problem, 36 U. Dr. L.J.
457, 459 (1959).
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The objections -to the position taken in Opinion 297 are that the
concurrent practice is condemned no matter how ethically it may be
conducted,2 2 and further, that the so-called feeder would arise from
the practice of accounting, a profession which prohibits advertising
and which is governed by a code of ethics comparable to the standards
established for the practice of law.23 The argument about the feeder
issue thus degenerates into a 'sort of tu quoque. The .feeder argument
has moral or ethical validity only if it is a true expression of prevailing
standards of conduct. Insofar as it is an attempt -to lay down a rule of
conduct which is intended to restrain some but is evaded by others in
either a subtle or flagrant manner, it lacks any moral force.
ADVOCACY V. INDEPENDENCE
The various issues which the dual practice has raised have a
tendency to advance and recede. At one moment, it appears that the
principal thrust of the argument concerns the feeder question. At
another moment, the dominant issue is the question of achieving
competence. At other times, the irreconcilability of the lawyer as
advocate and the accountant as independent valuer or attestor are
treated as the most decisive fact. The joint -report of the Ethics 'Com-
mittees of the Maryland and Baltimore Bar Associations sets forth
this conflict in the following language:
The lawyer is an advocate whose duty it is sincerely to
present his client's cause and the facts thereof, 'in the best and
most convincing manner, in accord with his client's interests.
On the other hand, the Certified Public Accountant is pledged to
give the public an uncolored, impartial, and full statement and
analysis of 'his clients' financial situation. He does not advocate,
but certifies to the exactitude of his findings upon which the
public has a right to depend. One who acts in the dual capacity
here being considered, may therefore be continually confronted
with a conflict of duty to his client and to the public and faced
with a temptation which the nature of man finds increasingly
difficult to resist. The client is entitled to honest, energetic
advocacy from his lawyer and on the other hand to impartial
exactitude in accounting from ,his CPA.'
The objection to the foregoing statement is that the joint report
sets up a stereotype advocate and stereotype accountant and then
proceeds to draw conclusions from these fictions. The assumption that
every lawyer is acting as advocate during his entire life is fallacious.
When the estate planner consults with his client and is called upon to
take into account an improvident wife or retarded child in formulating
programs for planning the client's estate, it would indeed be stretching
22. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 125-26, points out that Canon 27 does not mention
feeding.
23. See Comment, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rtv. 360, 367 (1956); 19 LA. L. REv. 831,
833-34 (1959).
24. The Daily Record, supra note 7, at col. 4.
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the word "advocate" to say that the lawyer falls into this category.
The term "advocate" implies a conflict with an identifiable adversary.
Neither the wife, the child, nor even the Internal Revenue Service
could fairly be described as such an adversary. When -the lawyer burns
the midnight oil to prepare a registration statement for filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, he is not acting as an advocate.
He is doing a job for his client which must also be "uncolored, im-
partial" and a "full statement and analysis." The thousands of lawyers
who spend their days in the Record Offices scattered over our country
do not carry out this function in the mantle of advocacy.
On the other hand, a certified public accountant may be living a
useful, busy, and productive life without engaging in the certification
of his client's financial situation. He may, in fact, be called upon to act
as advocate and may legitimately do so in ways quite similar to that
of a lawyer. The most obvious example of this practice is representation
of clients before Internal Revenue Service or the Tax Court. It is diffi-
cult to draw a valid line between the manner in which a lawyer will
handle a tax case and the way in which a CPA would 'handle the
same tax case.25
Outside of the tax field, the certified public accountant may also
find himself legitimately employed in all sorts of business negotiations
where his position is clearly that of advocate. Aside from the question
of the dual practice, the client may feel that -on personal grounds he is
more comfortable in entering into negotiations for the sale of his
business, or the acquisition of another business, or complicated con-
tractual disputes, with his CPA rather than his lawyer at his side.
The fact that an individual is qualified in two lines of endeavor
does not mean that he has a split personality."' On the contrary, it
may well be that in those two lines of professional activity the indi-
vidual practitioner has found a oneness, an identity which he would
not achieve in either profession alone.
Another objection to the use of the "advocacy and loyalty" argu-
ment as an inseparable quality of the lawyer is that it reduces the
concept of advocacy to the lowest form of partiality in which every
value is subordinated to the end of winning the client's case. The ethical
rules of the legal profession strive for a 'higher level than this type of
blind allegiance.
As a bait to the dual practitioner, it is pointed out that there is
no objection to having 'him use all the 'skills which he may possess
as a CPA; the condemnation extends only to the holding out. The
objection -to this makes'hift solution is -that holding out is essential to
25. See Blake, Tax Practice, Responsibilities and Interrelationships, J. ACCOUNT-
ANCY 31, 34-35 (March, 1967), which considers whether the representation of the
client in a tax case will diminish the independence of the CPA.
26. A note published in the HARVARD LAW ljvmw in 1950 referred to the
"schizophrenic position as a lawyer with a duty of loyalty to his client and as a CPA
with a duty of impartiality." 63 HARV. L. Rgv. 1457, 1458 (1950). The schizophrenic
phrase has persisted in the literature on the dual practice but it may very well be that
the schizophrenia was in the mind of the author of the note rather than in the mind of
the dual practitioner.
27. Comment, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 360, 368-69 (1956).
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the broadening of the practitioner's experience. The dual qualification
cannot 'be effectively -used as a badge to be concealed under the table.
We are not dealing with ivory-tower research; we are dealing with
active business discipline which must be tested and developed in the
business world.
In a recent Reith lecture, John Kenneth Galbraith pointed out,
"that to a far greater extent than we imagine our beliefs and cultural
attitude are accommodated to the needs and goals of the industrial
mechanism by which we are served." 28 The dual practitioner contends
that he is serving the needs and goals of the society on which he is
dependent and in which he is living. The opponents of dual practice
contend that the public, which includes the courts as well as clients,
is confused and that the functions of the accountant and of the lawyer
must be kept so separate that where both services are required they
should be furnished by two practitioners. To this the dual practitioner
responds that the medium which he represents is unique and valuable,
admittedly novel, and one that should be permitted and encouraged to
develop.
It has also been urged that the concept of privileged communica-
tion extends to lawyers but not to accountants, and, therefore, further
conflicts must occur in the dual practice. This general conclusion over-
states the case. The question of privileged communication is one of
local law.29 Furthermore, the privilege is the privilege of the client and
not the privilege of the practitioner. The statutory privilege granted in
Maryland with respect to accountants' communications is not based on
common law and is not recognized by the federal courts. The question
of privileged communication may arise -in many circumstances, but
the difficulties presented are, by no means, insuperable and hardly
provide a sound argument for condemning the dual practice in general.
PROFICIENCY OR COMPETENCE
No one is likely to deny that, in general, both ,law and accounting
are broad fields with many ramifications, or that specifically the field
of income taxation, as well as almost every other field of administrative
law in which the dual practitioner is likely to be interested, has grown
increasingly complex. The mere naming of administrative agencies,
such as Internal Revenue 'Service, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Federal Trade Commission, etc., sets up a series of warning
lights which any lawyer or accountant would disregard at his peril.
In all these fields, the client demands and has a right to expect the
highest degree of proficiency. The techniques involved are specialized
and extend beyond the knowledge of law to a thorough understanding
of the organizational structure of the agency. The dual practitioner,
however, by holding himself out as qualified in two professions, makes
no claim of outstanding competence in either. He 'has merely expanded
the field from which he has chosen his areas of major interest and is
ready to submit to the standards of qualification applied to other prac-
28. The Listener (London), Nov. 17, 1966, p. 712.
29. MD. CODF ANN. art. 75A, § 20 (1957).
[VOL. XXVII
DUELING OVER THE DUAL PRACTICE
titioners. The argument against the dual practice insists that he confine
his choices to one field or the other.
The degree of competence which the dual practitioner i's likely
to attain could almost be stated as a mathematical formula. It may be
represented as his response, in terms of his native and acquired
abilities, to the problems confronting him. These factors are highly
personal and cannot be prejudged without attempting to determine in
advance the capacity of an individual to grow and develop. One has
only to examine the courses offered in the name of continuing legal
education to realize that we are dealing with an evolving society in
which a large measure of experiment and novelty should be encouraged.
In the scientific disciplines, ,the combination of skills ,has 'become too
common to require much comment."0 As a matter of experience, we
find that most work of any complexity is performed in a team or joint
effort. One individual may offer leadership, direction, or criticism but
the end product is a composite where the separate contributions are
not always distinguishable."
The difficulties of professional practice are, by no means, confined
to the dual practitioner. Firms of certified public accountants have
during the last few years been subjected to a series of suits instituted
by investors and creditors of the companies they audit. In all these
cases, the CPA firms profess to be independent and objective, but the
quality of their performance is being subjected to legal determination.
A further degree of discomfort has been introduced by the attack
of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the independence
of the accountant where management services are performed by the
accounting firm for its clients as a lucrative sideline.3 2 Thus, the prob-
lem of ramifications confronts not only the dual practitioner but the
lawyer-CPA seeking to pursue a so-called single road. We do not
simplify these problems by insisting on the maintenance of ancient
barriers. Higher achievement is possible only in meeting new and greater
challenges.
THE ECONOMICS OF THE DUAL PRACTICE
The argument that the dual practitioner is able to offer the public
a more complete and less expensive service than the single practitioner
is hardly susceptible to proof."3  Although the statement is made that
the dual practice serves to provide a substantial saving to the small
business man, it is not necessarily true. In all cases, the bill that is
rendered the client will be based on the time spent, the results achieved,
30. The applicability of the techniques of one discipline to another is well stated
by ERICKSON, INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY 77. "A transfer of concepts from one field
to another has in other fields led to a revolutionary clarification and yet eventually to a
necessary transcendence of the borrowed concept by newer and more adequate ones."
In the JOHNS HOPKINS JOURNAL for November-December 1966, a leadin, article was
entitled Engineers Reshaping Medicine and the first sentence reads: 'Engineering
is revolutionizing medicine and producing a new breed of scientist."
31. For additional discussion of the proficiency or competence issue, see Gold-
berg, supra note 2, at 132-33; Brent, supra note 14, at 40-41.
32. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1966 (Financial section).
33. Comment, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 360, 369 (1956).
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and the rate which the practitioner applies to -his services. We may
grant that the dual practitioner might ;be able to do the work in less
time -than -two single practitioners, 'but this is hardly proof that the
bill rendered will likewise be -less. The other difficulty with this argu-
ment is that too much importance is attached to the bill, whereas
the client is generally more concerned with results. Here the position
of the dual practitioner is no different from that of the single prac-
titioner. If the bill is reasonable in terms of the outcome achieved, the
client has no justifiable ground for complaint.
THE LEGISLATIVE TWIST
Something new has been added to the history of -the controversy
concerning the dual practice by the introduction, on February 9, 1967,
in the House of Delegates of Maryland, of the Boyer Bill to treat
dual practice as a misdemeanor.' It is startling to find that the mis-
demeanor provision has been attached to the section of the bill dealing
with the CPA, who holds himself out as such and practices law, but
is omitted from the prohibition concerning the lawyer who engages in
the practice of or holds himself out as a certified public accountant.
It is also interesting to note that the prohibition against the practice
of law in a dual capacity is extended to include a person "whether he
is duly admitted to the Bar or not." As there are already sufficient safe-
guards against the practice of law by persons who have not 'been duly
admitted to the Bar, there was no need to include this gratuitous quali-
fication in a bill.
The evolution of the police power of the State and ,how it has been
limited by the courts has a direct bearing on the constitutionality of
the Boyer Bill. The older Maryland rule appears to be that no infringe-
ment of vested rights would arise out of the regulation of a profes-
sion.3" Thus, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 1877 had no difficulty
in approving a statute which restricted the practice of law to "white
males" and, when the white descriptive was dropped, continued to
approve the prohibition of the practice of law by women." Such
approval by the Court of Appeals rested on what was naively described
as "nature, reason, and experience."
More recent statements with regard to the police power recognize
that there must be a necessary and immediate relation to public health,
morals, or welfare, and that private rights may not 'be arbitrarily over-
ridden and disregarded under the guise of the exercise of police power.37
The impact of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has
been recognized in testing state action in excluding persons from a busi-
ness, profession, or occupation in which they may 'be engaged." In the
34. House of Delegates, Maryland H.B. No. 326 introduced by Delegate Boyer -
Judiciary 1967.
35. Aitchison v. State, 204 Md. 538, 105 A.2d 495 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
880 (1954).
36. In re Maddox, 93 Md. 727, 50 Atl. 407 (1901) ; In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28 (1877).
37. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) ; Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385.
37 A.2d 880 (1944) ; Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 Atl. 534 (1936).
38. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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field of taxation, the Massachusetts court has recognized that there is an
overlapping of work performed by attorneys and certified public ac-
countants and an arbitrary insistence on the separation of these func-
tions would be neither reasonable nor realistic.39 Thus, the Boyer Bill
seems to suffer from inherent constitutional weaknesses, which are also
present in Opinion 297 and the joint report of the Maryland and
Baltimore Bar Association Ethics Committees.4" The Boyer Bill does,
however, call attention to the fact that in Maryland the determination
of qualification for admission to the Bar is a legislative function and
not a judicial prerogative which has been delegated to bar associations.4
The underlying intent of the Boyer Bill, as well as Opinion 297
and the joint report of the Maryland and Baltimore Bar Associations
Ethics Committees, is to regulate admission to the Bar. If the position
taken were legal, it would mean that no one could properly be admitted
to the Bar if he planned to hold himself out thereafter as a CPA.
Consequently, even before admission there should be a public and
affirmative renunciation of any intent to hold one's self out as a certi-
fied public accountant. Perhaps, the whole issue may turn on whether
the legislature or the Bar Association has the right to impose -this test
as a qualification. Only if this power is being properly asserted is there
any legality in the position taken either in the Boyer Bill or the Opinion
and report above referred to.
At this moment, we do not know whether the conflict raging
around the dual practice will be resolved by legislation, court action,
or disposition by professional associations. Both sides claim that behind
them stands the ultimate sovereign power of the state. Perhaps the
standard of judgment may be found outside formal legal precedents.
In determining how this power may be invoked, the dual practitioner
contends: "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others."42
39. See Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943). In
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court said: "For a state may not,
under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights."
40. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) ; Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) ; In re Ricciardi, 182 Calif. 675, 189 Pac. 694 (1920).
See also Goldberg, supra note 2, at 136-41.
41. In Bastian v. Watkins, 230 Md. 325, 329, 187 A.2d 304, 306 (1963), the
Maryland Court of Appeals said: "It has long been recognized that the admission of a
resident of Maryland to practice law is a legislative, not a judicial, function in that
the right may constitutionally be regulated by statute."
42. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 17.
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